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Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3 ed. (Washington, D.C., 2007), 3.
Clara Portela, Targeted Sanctions against Individuals on Grounds of Grave Human Rights Violations – Impact, Trends and Prospects at EU Level, Briefing Paper (European Parliament, Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, 2018), 7, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ STUD/2018/603869/EXPO_STU(2018)603869_EN.pdf.
Clara Portela, European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy – When and Why Do They Work? (London and New York, NY, 2010).
Ibid.; Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Tourinho, eds., Targeted Sanctions – The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action (Cambridge, 2016); Margaret Doxey, “Reflections on the Sanctions Decade and Beyond”, International Journal 64, no. 2 (2009): 539–49.
Portela, Targeted Sanctions (see note 2), 8.
United Nations Security Council, Letter to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United States and the United Kingdom to the United Nations, S/1995/300 (New York, NY, 13 April 1995).
Portela, Targeted Sanctions (see note 2), 8.
Biersteker, Eckert, and Tourinho, Targeted Sanctions (see note 4), 26.
The UN sanctions on Iraq, which lasted from August 1990 until May 2003, represent an example of such a sanctions period. See: Mikael Eriksson, Targeting Peace – Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions (London and New York, NY, 2011), 46.
Ibid., 47.
Francesco Giumelli, Coercing, Constraining, Signalling: Explaining UN and EU Sanctions after the End of the Cold War (Colchester, 2011), 32.
Ibid., 34.
If sanctions are feasible, then the target knows what to do and the requested behavioral change usually does not endanger the target’s existence. The feasibility of the demand(s) is constituted by two dimensions: preciseness and practicality. The two dimensions for direct material impact are constituted by the cost of sanctions and the dependence on the resource denied to targets. See: Giumelli, Coercing, Constraining, Signalling (see note 11), 36–39.
Thomas Biersteker and Clara Portela, EU Sanctions in Context: Three Types, Issue Brief, no. 26 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2015), https://www.iss.europa. eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_26_EU_sanctions.pdf.
Brendan Taylor, Sanctions as Grand Strategy (London, 2010).
Biersteker, Eckert, and Tourinho, Targeted Sanctions (see note 4), 30.
Ko Sangtu, “Keynote Address” (EIAS Briefing Seminar, 20 October 2017), http://www.eias.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2016/03/EIAS_Event_Report_Quo_Vadis_NorthKorea_20.10. 2017-2.pdf.
European Commission, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations – North Korea (DPRK), 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/asia-and-pacific/north-korea_en.
Axel Berkofsky, EU’s Policy towards the DPRK – Engagement or Standstill? Briefing Paper (Brussels: European Institute for Asian Studies, 2003), 23, http://nautilus.org/wp-content/ uploads/2011/12/eudprkstandstill.pdf.
KEDO was established in 1995 by the US, Japan, and South Korea with the aim to implement the Geneva Framework Agreement between the US and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which, in the short term, would freeze North Korea’s nuclear program at the 1994 level. In the long term, with the help of KEDO, the existing North Korean nuclear facilities are to be completely dismantled and replaced by modern, proliferation-resistant, light-water reactors (LWRs). KEDO’s main tasks were to provide the financing for the two LWRs as well as to supplement North Korea’s energy supply by providing alternative energy until the two reactors are completed. For further information on KEDO, see: Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull, Kernwaffen in Nordkorea. Regionale Stabilität und Krisenmanagement durch das Genfer Rahmenabkommen (Bonn, 2013).
Eun-Jeung Lee and Eric J. Ballbach, “Haeksim kaeibin’ga tansun tongsaengin’ga? Pŭrwiserŭi taebukhan chŏngch’aek maengnagesŏ chomyŏnghanŭn EUŭi taebukhan mit ton-gasia anbo chŏngch’aek,” [Key Intervention or Simple Companionship? Brussel’s North Korea Policy in the Context of the EU’s Security Policy in East Asia], in Hanbandonŭn t’ongil togiri toel su issŭlkka? [Can the Korean Peninsula Become a Unified Germany?], ed. Im Hyŏk-baek and Lee Eun-Jeung, (Seoul: Peace and Democracy Institute, 2010), 267–400.
The EU’s proactive initiatives in the early 2000s must also be placed in context of then South Korean president Kim Dae-jung’s own policy of engagement – the so-called Sunshine Policy – who called upon EU members to support his new approach to North Korea.
See, e.g.: Rüdiger Frank, “EU-North Korean Relations: No Efforts without Reasons”, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 11, no. 2 (2002): 87–119.
Observers of the nuclear conflict on the Korean peninsula often distinguish the first nuclear crisis (1993/1994), which started when Pyongyang initially announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT, from the second nuclear crisis (2002/2003). Furthermore, a third (and since then ongoing) crisis emerged with North Korea’s first nuclear test on 9 October 2006. For a history of the nuclear conflict, see: Eric J. Ballbach, “Identität/Macht/Politik: Die Nuklearkrise und Nordkoreas Außenpolitik”, in Länderbericht Korea, ed. Eun-Jeung Lee and Hannes B. Mosler (Bonn, 2015), 508–23.
Eric J. Ballbach, The End of Critical Engagement – On the Failures of the EU’s North Korea Strategy, Analyses of the Royal Elcano Institute, ARI 101/2019 (Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute, 6 November 2019), https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/ en/analyses/the-end-of-critical-engagement-on-the-failures-of-the-eus-north-korea-strategy/.
European Parliament, Delegation for Relations with the Korean Peninsula, “Ad Hoc Delegation Visit to North Korea 21–24 February 2004”, Press release (Brussels, n.d.), http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/dkor20050426_003/dkor20050426_003en.pdf.
European Commission, “The European Commission Will Give Emergency Food Aid to North Korea”, Press release (Brussels, 4 July 2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-826_en.htm?locale=en.
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1695 (New York, NY, 15 July 2006), https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Disarm%20SRES1695.pdf.
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1718 (New York, NY, 14 October 2006), https://www. undocs.org/S/RES/1718%20(2006).
Council of the European Union, Council Common Position 2006/795/CFSP (Brussels, 20 November 2006), https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32006 E0795&from=IT; Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 (Brussels, 27 March 2007), https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007 R0329&from=EN.
Interview of the author with a representative from the European Council, Brussels, November 2018; Interview of the author with a representative from the European Council, January 2019; Interview of the author with a representative from the European External Action Service (EEAS), January 2019.
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1874 (New York, NY, 12 June 2009), https://www.undocs. org/S/RES/1874%20(2009).
Council of the European Union, Common Position 2009/ 573/CFSP (Brussels, 27 July 2009), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009E0573&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) No 1283/2009 (Brussels, 22 December 2009), https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009R1283 &from=EN.
For example, a full ban on trading with the DPRK was avoided due to Chinese and Russian objections, warning that the collapse of the North Korean economy would have dramatic consequences for the region. See: Ewen MacAskill, “UN Approves ‘Unprecedented’ Sanctions against North Korea over Nuclear Test”, The Guardian (online), 12 June 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/12/un-north-korea-nuclear-sanctions.
Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2009/ 599/CFSP (Brussels, 4 August 2009), https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009D0599 &from=EN.
Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2009/ 1002/CFSP (Brussels, 22 December 2009), https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2009:346:FULL &from=EN.
Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2010/ 800/CFSP (Brussels, 22 December 2010), https://eur-lex.europa. eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:341:0032:0044: EN:PDF.
Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2011/ 860/CFSP (Brussels, 19 December 2011), https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2011:338:FULL&from=EN.
Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) No 567/2010 (Brussels, 29 June 2010), https://eur-lex.europa. eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:163:0015:0029: EN:PDF.
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2087 (New York, NY, 22 January 2013), https://www. undocs.org/S/RES/2087%20(2013).
Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2013/ 88/CFSP (Brussels, 18 February 2013), https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013JC0003&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) No 296/2013 (Brussels, 26 March 2013), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:090:0004: 0009:EN:PDF.
Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Brussels, 10 December 2012), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ en/PRES_12_516.
Interview with an official from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 January 2020.
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2094 (New York, NY, 7 March 2013), https://www.undocs. org/S/RES/2094%20(2013).
Victor Cha, UN Security Council Passes New Resolution 2094 on North Korea (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), https://www.csis.org/analysis/un-security-council-passes-new-resolution-2094-north-korea.
Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2013/ 183/CFSP (Brussels, 22 April 2013), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:111:0052:0074:EN: PDF; Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) No 696/2013 (Brussels, 22 July 2013), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:198:0022:0027:EN:PDF.
Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2014/ 212/CFSP (Brussels, 14 April 2014), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0212&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2014/700/CFSP (Brussels, 8 October 2014), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0700&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2015/1066/ CFSP (Brussels, 2 July 2015), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0700&from=EN.
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2270 (New York, NY, 2 March 2016), https://www.undocs. org/S/RES/2270(2016).
Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/319 (Brussels, 4 March 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D0319&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/ 475 (Brussels, 31 March 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D0475&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/476 (Brussels, 31 March 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D0476&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) 2016/682 (Brussels, 29 April 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0682&from=EN.
Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/785 (Brussels, 19 May 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D0785&from=EN.
Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 (Brussels, 27 May 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D0849&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) 2016/ 841 (Brussels, 27 May 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0841&from=BG.
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2321 (New York, NY, 2016), https://www.undocs.org/ S/RES/2321(2016).
Marcus Noland, Analysis of UNSCR 2321 Sanctions on North Korea, Policy Brief (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 30 November 2016), https://www. piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/analysis-unscr-2321-sanctions-north-korea.
Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2217 (Brussels, 8 December 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D2217&from=EN.
Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/345 (Brussels, 27 February 2017), https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D0345&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) 2017/ 330 (Brussels, 27 February 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0330&from=EN.
Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/666 (Brussels, 6 April 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D0666&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) 2017/ 658 (Brussels, 6 April 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0658&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/ 667 (Brussels, 6 April 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D0667&from=EN.
Council of the European Union, “North Korea: EU Expands Sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)”, Press release (Brussels, 6 April 2017), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/ 2017/04/06/eu-sanctions-dprk/.
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2356 (New York, NY, 2 June 2017), https://www.undocs. rg/S/RES/2356(2017).
Council of the European Union, Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/975 (Brussels, 8 June 2017), https:// op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f25872f0-4cd4-11e7-a5ca-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/ source-search.
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2371 (New York, NY, 5 August 2017), https://www. undocs.org/S/RES/2371(2017).
Council of the European Union, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1457 (Brussels, 10 August 2017), https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017 R1457&from=EN.
Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1548 (Brussels, 14 September 2017), https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017R1548; Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/ 1562 (Brussels, 14 September 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1597845607952&uri=CELEX:32017 D1562.
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2375 (New York, NY, 11 September 2017), https://www. un.org/securitycouncil/s/res/2375-%282017%29.
Council of the European Union, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1568 (Brussels, 15 September 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid= 1597845607952&uri=CELEX:32017R1568; Council of the European Union, Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/ 1573 (Brussels, 15 September 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1597845607952&uri=CELEX: 32017D1573; Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1836 (Brussels, 10 October 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017 R1836&qid=1597845607952&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1838 (Brussels, 10 October 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D1838&from=EN.
Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1858 (Brussels, 16 October 2017), https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1597845607952&uri=CELEX: 32017R1858; Council of the European Union, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1859 (Brussels, 16 October 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 32017R1859&from=EN; Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1860 (Brussels, 16 October 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv: OJ.LI.2017.265.01.0008.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2017:265I:TOC.
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2397 (New York, NY, 22 December 2017), https:// undocs.org/S/RES/2397(2017); Council of the European Union, Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2018/16 (Brussels, 8 January 2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?qid=1598264068532&uri=CELEX:32018D0016; Council of the European Union, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/12 (Brussels, 8 January 2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1598264068532 &uri=CELEX:32018R0012; Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/293 (Brussels, 26 February 2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid= 1598264068532&uri=CELEX:32018D0293; Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) 2018/285 (Brussels, 26 February 2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?qid=1598264068532&%20uri=CELEX:32018R0285.
Antoine Bondaz and Eric J. Ballbach, “Coping with Natural Disasters: How the EU Can Support More Effective DPRK Disaster Management Mechanisms” (Washington, D.C.: 38 North, 4 November 2021), https://www.38north.org/2021/ 11/coping-with-natural-disasters-how-the-eu-can-support-more-effective-dprk-disaster-management-mechanisms/.
Council of the European Union, “EU Imposes Further Sanctions over Serious Violations of Human Rights around the World”, Press release (Brussels, 22 March 2021), https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/ 22/eu-imposes-further-sanctions-over-serious-violations-of-human-rights-around-the-world/.
Thomas Biersteker and Zuzana Hudáková, “Are Sanctions on North Korea Working?”, Global Asia 16, no. 3, https:// www.globalasia.org/v16no3/cover/are-sanctions-on-north-korea-working_thomas-biersteker-zuzana-hud%C3%A1kov %C3%A1.
Giumelli, Coercing, Constraining, Signalling (see note 11).
Giumelli, Coercing, Constraining, Signalling (see note 11), 36. On North Korea’s identity construction in opposition to the US, see: Eric J. Ballbach, “North Korea’s Emerging Nuclear State Identity: Discursive Construction and Performative Enactment”, The Korean Journal of International Studies 14, no. 3 (2016): 391–414.
Eric J. Ballbach, “Between Autonomy and Influence? Multilateralism and North Korean Foreign Policy in the Six-Party Talks”, in Korea 2013: Politics, Economy and Society, ed. Rüdiger Frank, Jim Hoare, Patrick Köllner and Susan Pares (Leiden and Boston, 2013), 215–39.
Giumelli, Coercing, Constraining, Signalling (see note 11), 34.
The fact that sanctions are considered an imperative element of the EU’s dealings with North Korea does not mean that all member states share the same position with regard to the question about what exactly the sanctions should achieve (coerce, signal, constrain), how far-reaching they should be, and if they should be paralleled by tangible diplomatic initiatives.
Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, Press release (Brussels, 17 July 2017), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ en/press/press-releases/2017/07/17/conclusions-korea/.
Interview of the author with a representative from the EEAS, Brussels, January 2019.
“Hostel at North Korea’s Berlin Embassy Must Close, German Court Rules”, Reuters (online), 28 January 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-northkorea-hostel-idUSKBN1ZR244.
Interview of the author with a representative from the EEAS, Brussels, March 2018.
Final Report of the Panel of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2345 (2017) (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, 5 March 2018), 75, https://www.undocs.org/S/2018/ 171.
Simultaneously, the German government upped its diplomatic pressure, continuing to stress the embassy’s obligation to cease using its property for non-diplomatic purposes and urged it on numerous occasions at all levels to abide by the applicable resolution. As a result, on 10 August 2017, the embassy of the DPRK terminated the leases with the two companies, requesting them to vacate the premises by 30 September 2017. However, both companies rejected the termination of their leases and threatened legal action. On 6 November 2017, the Central Customs Authority formally opened legal proceedings against the companies engaging in illicit activities under the above-mentioned legislation.
Frank, “EU-North Korean Relations” (see note 23), 93.
Eurostat, Comext, Statistical regime 4, https://trade.ec. europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.pdf.
European Parliament, Delegation for Relations with the Korean Peninsula, “Minutes of Meeting with Mr. Pak Hyon-Bo, Ambassador of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (Brussels, 18 January 2005), https://www.europarl. europa.eu/delegations/en/archives/6/dkor/home.
That is not to say that those states that argue for a more active role of the EU to solve the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula do not support sanctions as a significant means to deal with Pyongyang. Rather, as interviews with Foreign Ministry officials have shown, it is more accurate to say that these states are in favor of paralleling sanctions and diplomacy.
“Merkel Sees No Military Solution to U.S. Dispute with North Korea”, Reuters (online), 11 August 2017, https://www. reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-merkel-idUSKBN1AR1BN.
See, e.g.: Antoine Bondaz, From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments: A Renewed EU Strategy for the North Korean Proliferation Crisis, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers, no. 67 (February 2020): 12; Eric J. Ballbach, “The Role of the EU in the Korean Peninsula Peace Process”, Asia Trends 6 (2021): 54–67; Ballbach, The End of Critical Engagement (see note 25).
Ballbach, The End of Critical Engagement (see note 25).
Council of the European Union, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (Brussels, 28 June 2016), 39, 45 (emphasis added), https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/ eu-global-strategy/17304/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en.
Council of the European Union, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (see note 88), 28.
Interview of the author with an official from the EEAS, January 2019.
Ian Bond, “Out of Range, out of Mind: Is There a Role for Europe in the Korean Crisis?” Boulevard Extérieur, 13 April 2013, https://www.boulevard-exterieur.com/Out-of-range-out-of-mind-Is-there-a-role-for-Europe-in-the-Korean-crisis.html.
Mario Esteban, The EU’s Role in Stabilising the Korean Peninsula, Working Paper (Elcano Royal Institute, 2019), http:// www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/ contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/wp1-2018-esteban-eu-role-stabilising-korean-peninsula.
Antoine Bondaz, From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments: A Renewed EU Strategy for the North Korean Proliferation Crisis, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers, no. 67 (February 2020): 12.
Eric J. Ballbach, “Socialization on a Second Track? European Track 1.5 Initiatives with North Korea”, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 29, no. 1 (2020): 77–105.
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